Risks of mirror bacteria
In this study we discuss the feasibility and potential risks of creating an alternative form of life called mirror bacteria. We call upon the broader scientific community and policymakers to engage in discussion and to implement guardrails to avert this potentially severe threat from unfolding.
All known life in the natural world is homochiral — DNA and RNA are composed of right-handed nucleotides, and proteins are made from left-handed amino acids. Mirror versions of these and other essential components of life can be created in the lab, and someday in the future could be combined to create an entirely mirror bacterium.
Mirror bacteria would function just as their natural, homochiral counterparts with two exceptional differences: mirror bacteria may evade the immune defenses of humans, animals, and plants, and they may escape natural predators in the environment, causing potentially severe harm. Our homochiral world is ill equipped to defend against mirror versions of life.
The path to mirror bacteria is not inevitable. To get there would require significant financial investment and technological advancements over a decade or more. Interest in mirror bacteria is currently academic. Any medical uses of mirror proteins and nucleic acids can be met by current chemical synthesis approaches.
We can think of no beneficial application for mirror bacteria and no biocontainment strategy that would offset these risks. We encourage further research into the potential risks, but absent compelling evidence to the contrary, we recommend preventing the creation of mirror bacteria, and advancing oversight of enabling technologies and raw materials.
Related applications
Mirror biomolecules, such as mirror-image nucleic acids and proteins, have scientific and potential therapeutic applications. These include research applications like aptamers, biocatalysis, and phage display, as well as the incorporation of D-amino acids into synthetic peptides or protein drugs.
We recommend that research on such mirror biomolecules continues, as it does not directly enable the creation of mirror bacteria and is of great value to basic science.
Author statements
“JCVI has a long history of measured and deliberate review and discourse on ethical and societal issues surrounding new and exciting, but potentially problematic areas of genomic research. Before we began experiments in constructing the first synthetic bacterial cell, we engaged with bioethicists and other thought leaders about the work and its implications. We believe that mirror life is an area that has the potential to cause catastrophic issues for life on Earth. A halt on efforts aimed at its creation is warranted until we can better understand the risks. Engagement and discourse with the scientific community, governments and the public are imperative. There are some potential upsides of this work that offer positive outcomes in areas such as drug development, but without a cautious approach we risk grave outcomes. We hope that this paper will serve as the wake-up call for all of us to come together and develop a rational path forward.” – J. Craig Venter, Ph.D.
“The danger of mirror life is its fundamental difference. Mirror molecules bacteria might be unassailable by the non-mirror world as a consequence of their basic reversed molecular structure. A self-replicating organism built of from mirror components — one that’s capable of sustaining itself and multiplying in the wild — would likely be invisible to many of the processes nature has evolved that keep a species in check. It’s vital that we head off those risks before they materialize.” – John Glass, Ph.D.
Synthetic genomics policy research at J. Craig Venter Institute
The J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) takes biosafety, biosecurity, environmental protection, and ethical considerations of research seriously. In 2007, we published a report on the examination of safety, security concerns, and governance related to the emerging field of synthetic genomics. Additional JCVI co-authored reports have expanded on this initial effort, examining regulatory challenges, technological advancements, the environment, and the geopolitical landscape as it relates to biotechnology.
We have consistently applied these same standards to our own body of work. In 2010, when we announced the construction of the first self-replicating bacterial cell with a synthetic genome, we also laid out the ethical and societal implications of this seminal work as well as the scientific rationale. Furthering this research, in 2016, we announced the construction of the first self-replicating bacterial cell with a minimized synthetic genome. Again, we shared additional discussions around the ethical and societal implications of synthetic genomics research at JCVI.
As the science of synthetic biology advances, so too must the conversations around the ethical, societal, practical, technological, biosafety, and biosecurity impacts continue. JCVI is committed to our mission to understand more about the biological world, and to develop unique insights and answers about disease, health, and the environment for the benefit of all.
Funding
J. Craig Venter Institute and staff involved received no funding related to this research.
Principal Investigator
Key Staff
- Sebastian Oehm, PhD
- James Smith, PhD
- J. Craig Venter, PhD
Media Contact
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